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Abstract
This study empirically tests Pouder & St. John's propositions (1996) on the evolutions of
geographic clusters, in the context of the U.S. biotechnology industry. We find that
during the origination period of the cluster evolution clustered biotechnology firms
exhibit higher cost economies and legitimacy in obtaining resources than non-clustered
competitors. While, after the early period, such clustered firms' advantage in resource
access and innovations are statistically significantly declining. These findings evidence
the decline of positive net benefits from geographic clustering over time. Given the
inconsistent empirical results in the literature on whether there are positive net benefits to
geographically clustered firms, this study sheds light on the importance of time
dimension in geographic clustering to understand the net benefits of geographic
clustering. Since economies and diseconomies of agglomeration change over time, the
net benefits of geographic clustering can be time-variant, possibly leading to different
empirical results if the evolution of geographic clustering is not appropriately considered.
Accordingly, this study answers a call to empirical studies on dynamics of geographic
clustering.
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In spite of increased attention on geographic concentration in industries, there is
little consensus on the benefits of geographic clustering to clustered firms. Recently,
Staber (1998) and Shaver & Flyer (2000) find higher organizational failure rates within
geographic clusters in the context of the German knitwear industry and the foreign direct
investments in the U.S. manufacturing industries, respectively. These results are
seemingly inconsistent with empirical findings of benefits from clusters in early studies
(e.g., Hill & Naroff, 1984; Jaffe, Trajtenberg & Henderson, 1993; Audretsch & Feldman,
1996, DeCarolis & Deeds, 1999). This empirical inconsistency raises the question,
whether geographic clustering is really beneficial to clustered firms and regions. By
focusing on the evolution of geographic clusters over time, this study attempts to suggest
a way to reconcile the inconsistent findings of the net benefits from geographic
clustering.
Given very few theoretical studies on the evolution of geographic clusters, we
consider that the theory proposed by Pouder & St. John (1996) is one of the earliest and
compelling attempts to address the time-variant benefits of geographic clustering. They
argue that the benefits to geographic clustering vary by stages of development of the
clusters. During the early stage of geographic clusters (i.e., the origination phase),
economies of agglomeration (or, benefits of clusters) dominate diseconomies of
agglomeration (or, costs of clusters), showing positive net benefits of clusters. As time
goes by, clustered firms are likely to experience relatively high levels of congestion costs,
within-region competition for localized inputs, and knowledge expropriation, expecting
decline in the net benefits from geographic clustering in the later phases (i.e., the
convergence and the decline phases). Accordingly, we consider that geographic
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clustering can be either advantageous or disadvantageous to clustered firms, depending
on the phases of the evolutionary path of geographic clustering.
In this study, we empirically test relevant hypotheses derived from their theory, in
the context of the biotechnology industry. First, our attempt to empirically investigate the
evolutionary path of geographic clustering can verify the importance of time dimension
of the benefits of clustering and can suggest an approach to understand seemingly
inconsistent findings on the net benefits from geographic clustering.
Second, this study sheds light on empirical studies to test the effect of the cluster
evolution. Most of existing empirical works have concentrated on events at one point in
time to evaluate the effects of geographic clusters, such as clustered and non-clustered
firms' performance in initial public offerings (e.g., DeCarolis & Deeds, 1999) or their
long-term survival (e.g., Shaver & Flyer, 2000). These approaches, however, can neglect
the economic consequences of geographic clustering in the course of its evolutionary
process. If the benefits of clusters change during a considerable length of period, then the
static approaches cannot capture the economically significant time-varying characteristics
of clusters. Lastly, we also believe that our study can be significant to management
practices and public policy arena, for better evaluation of the net agglomeration
economies.
In what follows, we discuss theory and hypotheses on the changes in the net
benefits of geographic clustering, based on the theory of Pouder & St. John (1996).
Empirical methods including data and empirical designs follow in the next section.
Empirical results are summarized in the following section. We conclude the study with
discussion about limitations and issues for future studies.
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Theory and Hypotheses

As suggested by Marshall (1920) and Krugman (1994), among others, geographic
clustering is an increasing function of the net benefits to competing firms within a region.
If positive net benefits are expected from a geographic cluster, new entry will occur
within the cluster, enhancing geographic clustering. The net benefits to clustering are
determined by the benefits (economies) and the costs (diseconomies) of agglomeration.
The main sources of agglomeration economies are pooled labor forces, specialized
suppliers, and knowledge spillovers within a cluster (Krugman, 1994; Prevezer, 1997).
Firms can obtain quality labor and other input factors at lower costs within a clustered
region (Porter, 1998). The proliferation of innovations within the region can be possible
through localized knowledge spillovers via labor shifts (Almedia & Kogut, 1999),
interaction with research institutions (Audretsch & Feldman, 1996), or interfirm
relationship (Scott, 1989) within the region. Whereas, diseconomies of agglomeration
are generated by congestion costs, increased competition, and knowledge expropriation
(Prevezer, 1997; Shaver & Flyer, 2000). As competing firms gather within a region,
competition for input factors will increase. The risks of knowledge expropriation by
adjacent competitors also emerge with increased knowledge spillovers.
Given the theory of agglomeration, Pouder & St. John (1996) suggest that the
strength of economies and diseconomies of agglomeration varies with the age of
geographic clusters. They propose three distinct phases of the evolution of geographic
clusters: origination, convergence, and decline. During the origination phase, a cluster
exhibits high growth rate and innovative activities within the region, because a firm’s
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fundamental processes in resource access, legitimacy, and strategy formulation within the
cluster show cost economies and more innovative strategy formulation.
Over time, the growth rate and innovative activities of the cluster stabilize in the
convergence phase, as costs increase within the cluster due to congestion in resource
access, imitative behaviors from isomorphism, and inertia in strategic formulation. This
convergence phase ultimately leads to the decline of clusters that limit clustered firms’
resource-access, legitimating, and innovative capabilities and adversely affect the growth
of clusters. Accordingly, we consider that the growth of geographic clusters reflect the
net benefits to geographic clustering that will vary across phases of cluster development.
Then, we can expect the following hypothesis.

Hypothesis 1: The growth rate of geographic clustering in an industry is
declining over time.

Regarding the time-varying patterns of the growth of geographic clusters, we need
to specify the characteristics of each phase of the cluster evolution over time. We
consider that Pourder & ST. John’s (1996) theory on the evolutionary path of clusters is
worthwhile to elaborate. As discussed above, the characterization of the cluster evolution
is critical for better estimation of the effects of geographic clustering. A study focusing
on the cluster effects with respect to long-term firm performance (e.g., Shaver & Flyer,
2000) can only predict the ultimate effects of the geographic clustering doomed to be
deteriorated. This approach, however, cannot capture the positive economic
consequences of geographic clustering in the course of the cluster development. Whereas,
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a study without time-varying notion of the effects of clusters (e.g., DeCarolis & Deeds,
1999) can also be disadvantageous in terms of its ignorance of time dimension of
geographic clustering. In this regard, we set out to test Pouder & St. John’s major
propositions on the phases of the cluster evolution. Since their theory mainly focuses on
the origination and the convergence phase of the cluster development, we concentrate on
the first two phases.
Origination phase: According to Pouder & St. John (1996), the origination phase
begins with success by the initial firm(s) that can induce qualified suppliers, skilled
labors, and informed investors. This lowers the cost of entry for subsequent firms. In
addition, firms locating in the cluster can enhance legitimacy through relationship with
firms within the region. Clustered firms can share regional ties to a research base (e.g.,
research universities), a skilled labor pool, a network of qualified suppliers, and an
informed group of venture capitalists. Lastly, more informed strategy formulation
encourages the emergence of the cluster. During the origination phase, more information
within the cluster will help better strategy formulation through mobile labor force, social
interaction, cooperative alliances, direct observation, and local media.
To the contrary, competitors outside the cluster will face high costs for hiring
specialized employees and for transacting with suppliers and researchers, during the
origination phase. Firms outside the cluster also find difficulties in imitating the complex
routines involved in the infrastructure of the clustered firms and have more imperfect
information than clustered firms when identifying specialized labors and qualified
suppliers and innovation opportunities, struggling to maintain competitive parity with the
competitors in the cluster. Thus, in the cluster, more entry will be likely due to large
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benefits from the cluster than outside the cluster. Accordingly, we consider following
hypotheses originated from Pouder & St. John (1996). 1

Hypothesis 2: During the origination phase of the cluster evolution,
geographically clustered firms within the cluster will experience greater cost economies
and legitimacy than industry competitors that are outside of the cluster.
Hypothesis 3: During the origination phase, the rate of growth in number of
competitors within the cluster will exceed the rate of growth in numbers of competitors
outside the cluster.
Hypothesis 4: During the origination phase, clustered firms will be responsible
for an increasing proportion of industry innovations, compared to non-clustered
competitors.

1

Following hypotheses are basically duplicated from the propositions by Pouder & St. John (1996) for
empirical tests.
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Convergence phase: As the clusters move through the convergence phase,
advantages of clusters dissipate largely in three ways. First, the benefits from low costs to
access resources within the clusters will erode because congestion in the cluster bound
the cost economies. Second, legitimating processes also lead to isomorphism within the
clusters and hence induce imitative rather than innovative behaviors. Lastly, strategy
formulation within the clusters becomes homogenous and biased toward the strategies of
the clustered firms. This leads clustered firms to be less flexible in adjusting to
environmental changes. Firms outside the cluster are independent of this kind of adverse
selection process within regions (Shaver & Flyer, 2000).
Given the diminished benefits of the clusters, high density of existing firms in the
clusters after the origination phase intensifies localized competition in the clusters. As
knowledge spills over across regions, competitors outside the clusters will relatively
recover from strategic disparity. Thus, the pattern of entry and exit in the cluster and in
the overall industry will reach parity, and there will be no overall advantages for the
clusters. That is, the patterns of growth for both the clusters and the industry overall will
become similar. Consequently, we can expect following hypotheses. 2

Hypothesis 5: During the convergence phase, the agglomeration economies in
the cluster will erode, and the hot spot firms will experience cost economies similar to
competitors outside of clusters.
Hypothesis 6: During the convergence phase, cluster growth rate will stabilize
compared to the larger industry population.

2

As above, following hypotheses are basically duplicated from the propositions by Pouder & St. John
(1996) for empirical tests.
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Hypothesis 7: During the convergence phase, the collective rate of innovation
emanating from clusters will decrease over time.

Methods
Industry
We test above seven hypotheses in the context of the biotechnology industry. This
industry is appropriate for our empirical design. First, the industry is geographically
concentrated as over ninety percent of the population is clustered in nineteen major and
minor clusters (Burrill & Lee, 1993). Many studies have identified and examined
geographic clustering in this industry (e.g., Audretsch & Stephan, 1996; DeCarolis &
Deeds, 1999; Zucker, et al., 1999). In addition, the dominance of small firms in the
industry (seventy five percent of small firms in the total population (Burrill & Lee,
1993)) provides a relevant empirical context to test the theory proposed by Pouder & St.
John (1996). In their theory, one of the driving forces to time-varying net benefits of
geographic clusters consists of cost economies in resource procurement and obtaining
legitimacy. As pointed by Stuart, Huang, & Hybels (1999), small biotechnology ventures
are very sensitive to resource access and legitimacy. In this regard, the industry can be an
appropriate domain to study changes in the net benefits of clusters over time.
The patterns of the evolution of geographic clusters reflect important events in the
industry history. The contemporary biotechnology industry started with two radical
innovations – recombinant DNA (r-DNA) and cell fusion. In 1973, Boyer and Cohen
introduced r-DNA, genetic material from one cell into the DNA structure of another. As
such, this event is assumed to be the beginning of the industry (Stuart, et al., 1999).
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Milstein and Kohler succeeded in a second-generation technique of cell fusion that
creates a hybrid cell capable of producing highly purified proteins in two years later. The
year of 1980, however, induced true spurt in the number of new founding firms in the
industry, after 1) the U.S. Supreme Court decision that a new life form can be patentable,
2) the passage of the Patent and Trademark Amendment Act of 1980 that enabled
universities to apply for patents, and 3) Genentech’s successful initial public offering. A
major third-generation technique of protein engineering encouraged subsequent entry
during 1980s. Investors of the stock markets, however, constrained the speed of the
industry growth during the 1990s. 3

Sample
The data describe 825 U.S. biotechnology firms founded between 1973 and 1997.
We include both private and public firms founded from industry origin to most recent
years. Our data incorporate all biotechnology firms regardless of their market segments,
such as therapeutic, diagnostic, agricultural, veterinary, food-process, and others. This
allows a comprehensive and representative sample from the industry population, to study
the evolution of geographic clustering in the industry. The data set is established, mostly
based on Bioscan directory (published by Oryx Press) and the Actions database
(published by the North Carolina Biotechnology Center (NCBC)). These data sources are
commonly used for studying the biotechnology industry (e.g., Stuart, et al., 1999; Zucker,
et al., 1999).

3

For further review of the biotechnology industry history, see Stuart, et al. (1999) and Ryan, Freeman, &
Hybels (1995).
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Analysis
Geographic clusters. Our first task is to identify geographic clusters for analysis.
There is no agreement on how to cluster firms geographically. In the literature, most
studies have relied on the state as the unit of location (e.g., Krugman, 1994; Audretsch &
Feldman, 1996; Prevezer, 1997). Others have used the Metropolitan Statistical Area (e.g.,
DeCarolis & Deeds, 1999) or Economic Functional Area defined by the Department of
Commerce (e.g., Zucker, et al., 1999). These proxies for identifying geographic clusters
can sometimes be inadequate, if agglomeration effects are not constrained by such
conventionally identified boundaries. We consider that agglomeration economies are
centered on spatial proximity. Accordingly, we cluster firms by identifying geographic
distance based on each sample firm’s zip code.
In this study, we mostly use the first two digits of zip codes to identify geographic
clusters. In case that many states are located within relatively adjacent areas (e.g., New
England and Mid-Atlantic areas), we use three digits of zip codes that capture more
plausible distances related to agglomeration economies. 4 As shown in Table 1, this
process identifies nineteen major and minor clusters that accommodate at least ten
biotechnology firms within the regions. These identified clusters are similar to those
identified by Burrill & Lee (1991, 1992, & 1993) and Audretsch & Stephan (1996). 5 In
particular, ten largest clusters that we identified exactly overlap with top ten clusters in
the survey by Burrill & Lee (1993).
4

The first two digits of five-digit zip codes usually divide a state into two regions, according to the U.S.
Postal Service. The third digit in five-digit zip code stands for a post office that govern postal services
within a certain, equally divided region affiliated to a two-digit sub-region.
5
Biotechnology firms are geographically concentrated in three primary regions (the San Francisco Bay
Area, San Diego and Boston), two secondary regions (Philadelphia and New York), and a number of small
clusters (Audretsch & Stephan, 1996). Ernst & Young identify three primary regions, two secondary
regions, several other regions with at least 20 companies, and a host of small clusters (Burrill & Lee, 1992).
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Since Pouder & St. John (1996) implicitly dichotomize an industry into clustered
and non-clustered firms, we need to operationalize the concept of a geographic cluster
and clustered firms. Following Burill & Lee's (1993: vi) assumption, we use a criterion
that a regional unit is a cluster if it accommodates more than 20 competing firms.
Similarly, firms in clusters become clustered firms, while otherwise firms are nonclustered firms. From this criterion, the ten largest clusters in our sample are regarded as
clusters. As DeCarolis & Deeds (1999) did, we treat these ten largest clusters as main
geographic clusters that show a significant level of agglomeration economies. The other
nine minor clusters and other regions are assumed to be non-clustered regions. 6
[Insert Table 1 about here]
Identification of phases. To identify different phases of the evolution of clusters,
we need empirical definition of the phase of origination, convergence, and decline.
According to the theory of Pouder & St. John (1996:1196), each phase of the cluster
development is defined by the difference in growth between clustered and non-clustered
firms over time. If the difference in growth between clustered and non-clustered firms
increases, clusters are in the origination phase. If the difference in growth between them
starts to decrease, clusters begin to experience the convergence phase up to the point at
which the level of growth between clustered and non-clustered firms are equal. Beyond
that point, the dominant growth of non-clustered firms against clustered firms signifies
the decline phase. Figure 1 graphically describes these operational definitions.

6

For robustness, we considered another case that the six largest clusters are assumed to be clusters while
other regions are non-clustered. We had similar results while not reported. Whereas, if we consider
nineteen major and minor regions clusters (based on a criterion that a regional unit having more than ten
firms is assumed to be a cluster), we had significantly different results unreported in this study. We
conjecture that significant level of agglomeration economies comes from a region clustered with more than
ten competing firms in our sample.
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[Insert Figure 1 about here]
In this study, we identify the ending year of the origination phase by demarking
the year in which the maximum difference in growth between clustered and non-clustered
firms is observed during the study period. We measure the growth of clustered and nonclustered firms by number of firms in a cluster and non-clustered regions, as in DeCarolis
& Deeds (2000), among others. Since we have ten different clusters, we figure out the
maximum difference for each of ten clusters, by subtracting the average number of firms
in non-clustered regions - cluster 11 through 19 and non-clustered regions - from the
number of firms in a cluster. Then, we obtain the ending year of the origination phase for
each of ten clusters. The ending years of the origination period are shown in Table 1.
If the ending year of the origination phase coincides with the ending year of our
study period, clusters in the industry are still in the origination phase. If the ending year
of the origination phase falls into a year within our study period, clusters are in the
convergence phase after passing through the origination phase. Our data exhibits no such
points that the difference of growth between clustered and non-clustered firms becomes
zero (i.e., decline phase). Accordingly, during our study period, the biotechnology
industry appears to enter the convergence phases after the origination phase. Detailed
features of the cluster evolution in the industry are shown in Table 1.
Growth of clusters. To test hypothesis 1 on the overall growth pattern of
clustered firms over time, we measure the growth of clusters by the number of existing
biotechnology firms within clusters. Organizational ecologists commonly use the number
of existing firms in a cluster to measure the density of firms in a region (Carroll &
Hannan, 1995; Lomi, 1995). The underlying assumption of this measure is that firms are
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relatively homogenous and no scale economies exist in the industry. If firms are
significantly different in terms of their size and scale economies are important in the
industry, the number of existing firms can mislead the growth of clusters. The
agglomeration of small number of large firms may imply higher growth of a cluster than
the agglomeration of large number of small firms within a region. In the biotechnology
industry, however, ninety percent of the population consists of small and medium size
firms and scale economies rarely exist (Audretsch & Stephan, 1996). Accordingly, the
number of existing firms in a cluster can properly capture the growth of a cluster.
We consider polynomial regression models to fit the growth patterns of clustered
firms. Since hypothesis 1 suggests the growth of geographic clusters evolve in a nonmonotonic fashion over time, polynomial regression analysis is applied to test differences
in cluster growth across time. The pth order polynomial regression model can be
expressed as
p

N t = a + ∑ t i + et

(1)

i =1

where Nt: total number of biotechnology firms in clusters at year t, a: intercept, and et:
error terms.
The first to the third order polynomial regression models, in particular, are
considered to see the changes in the growth rates of clustered firms in the industry. Model
and coefficient significances and improvement of the goodness of fit can suggest the
better fitting of our data trends, testing hypothesis 1. Possible concerns about the
multicolinearity among polynomial components can be corrected through the
Huber/White/Sandwich correction process in STATA (statistical software that we use).
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Univariate/multivariate analysis. The six hypotheses proposed by Pouder & St.
John (1996) are related to see the differences in cost economies of resource procurement
and legitimacy, the rate of growth in the number of firms, and the innovations between
clusters and non-clusters during different phases of the evolution of clusters. We use both
univariate and multivariate analysis. For univariate analysis, we conduct mean difference
t-tests between clustered firms and non-clustered firms. We assume that variances within
two groups are equal, and hence we use a pooled variance to derive t-statistics. As such,
the mean difference test statistic that follow t-distribution with (nc+nn-2) degrees of
freedom can be expressed by
t=

(2)
Xc − Xn
1
1
( + )s 2
nc n n

≈ t nc + n n − 2 ,

(nc − 1) s c + (nn − 1) s n
, and
n1 + n2 − 2
2

where Xi : i' s mean of X, ni : i ' s number of observations, s 2 =

2

i = c (for clustered firms) or n (for non - clustered firms).

To complement univariate analysis, we consider multivariate analysis. Event
history analysis is undertaken to see how the likelihood of events changes between
clusters and non-clusters during different phases, even after controlling industry factors.
As such, the event history analysis model can be express as

λ (t ) = exp(aX (t ))
whereλ (t ) = lim
∆ →0

q (t , t + ∆)
.
∆

(3)

The exponential distribution assumption is suitable for modeling data with a constant
hazard and when there is no a priori expectation as to the nature of distribution.
Parameters are estimated by the maximum likelihood method using STATA. As an
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exception, for the average growth rates of clustered and non-clustered firms (hypothesis 3
and 6), we use ordinary least square regression models for multivariate analysis.
Cost economies and legitimacy. To see the effects of agglomeration on cost
structure and relations in the relevant community (hypothesis 2 and 5), we consider
differences in cost economies and legitimacy between clustered and non-clustered firms.
According to the theory by Pouder & St. John (1996), cost economies in resource
procurement and obtaining legitimacy are critical factors to the shifts in the economies
and diseconomies of agglomeration over time. Since legitimacy is closely tied to
efficiency in resource procurement (Hannan & Carroll, 1995: 25), we consider measures
for cost economies in resource procurement also reflect the legitimacy concerns. As
measures for these concepts, we use the count of public offerings by a sample firm, the
cumulative amount of public offerings raised by a sample firm, the count of private
offerings by a sample firms, and the count of a sample firm’s research alliances. The data
on these variables are gathered from the announcements in the Bioscan directory and the
Action database by NCBC.
Average growth rates of clusters and non-clusters. To test hypothesis 3 and 6
on the different growth patterns of clusters and non-clusters, we consider the average
growth rates of clusters and non-clusters. Since we have multiple regions within clusters
and non-clusters, we use the average growth rates of two categories. To measure the
average growth rates of clusters and non-clusters, we simply regress the total number of
sample firms in each category on years of our study period. And we use the estimated
betas from the simple regression as the measures for the average growth of clusters and
non-clusters. The empirical model can be expressed by
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N it = a + bt + eit

(4)

where Nit: total number of firms in I (clusters or non-clusters) at year t (year from 1973 to
1997).
Innovation. For testing hypothesis 4 and 7, we measure innovation performance
as the count of patents held by a sample firm. The count of patents is frequently used as a
measure for innovation performance (e.g., Audretsch & Feldman, 1996; DeCarolis &
Deeds, 1999). One possible concern about this measure is related to the fact that many
industries do not depend on patents to protect the profits from innovations (e.g., Levin,
Klevorick, Nelson & Winter, 1987). As reviewed in the brief industry history, however,
the industry shows important roles of patents in protecting the economic values of
innovations (Ryan, et al., 1995). Accordingly, we expect relatively little biases from this
measure.
Industry variables. To control for the industry variations in the multivariate
analysis, we consider measures for industry-level activities prior to the current period and
stock market variations. We use total count of public and private offerings by total firms
in the sample within the three months prior to the current month. These measures control
for “hot” and “cold” financing windows. We also use quarterly total number of research
alliances and patents held by total sample firms in three month prior to the current month.
Biotechnology stock index (monthly average) is also considered.

Results
Growth patterns of clustered firms. Polynomial regressions fit the growth
patterns of clustered firms over time. As exhibited in Table 2, among others, the third
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order polynomial model fits best the growth of clustered firms over time by its R-square
of almost 99.5 percent. As seen in its F-test statistic (F(1, 21)=125.06) for the
improvement of model significance, the time-cube term is highly significant, implying
that the growth rate of clustered firms is declining after its increase up to a certain point
(the end of the origination phase). Accordingly, this supports our hypothesis 1. The
second order polynomial model shows marginally different from the first order
polynomial model with its slightly significant model improvement by the term of timesquare (F(1, 22)=2.96). The forth order polynomial model only slightly improves its
model significance (F(1, 20)=5.44), compared to the third order polynomial model (not
reported in the table).
[Insert Table 2 about here]
Univariate analysis. Using mean difference test statistics that follow t
distribution, we test across-phase changes in difference between clustered and nonclustered firms’ cost economies and legitimacy effects (hypothesis 2 and 5), average
growth rates (hypothesis 3 and 6), and innovation performance (hypothesis 4 and 7).
Table 3 contains the detailed results of our univariate analysis. First, in terms of cost
economies and legitimacy, all proxies (average count of public offerings, average count
of private offerings, average cumulative amount of financing, and average count of
research alliances) exhibit the decrease in the differences between clustered and nonclustered firms over time as p-values of t-statistics decrease across phases. That is, as the
phase moves from the origination to the convergence, clustered firms’ benefits associated
with cost economies and legitimacy decrease, compared to those of non-clustered firms.
Significant differences between clustered and non-clustered firms in their private and
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public funding activities and their alliances still exist in the industry throughout our study
period. However, as the hypothesis 2 and 5 predict, it is evidenced that the benefits from
geographic clustering in clustered firms’ funding and alliance activities decrease over
time.
Regarding the difference in the average growth between clustered and nonclustered firms, the mean difference tests suggest that there exists no significant
difference in the average growth between clustered and non-clustered firms in the
convergence phase, while clustered firms outgrow non-clustered firms during the
origination phase. T-statistic for the origination phase is 75.85 significant (away from the
99 percent critical value of 2.75 in the t-distribution with more than 30 degrees of
freedom), contrasted with t-statistic of –2.09 insignificant (given the 99 percent critical
value of –4.6 in the t-distribution with 4 degrees of freedom) during the convergence
phase. This result evidences hypothesis 3 and 6 proposing that the growth of clustered
firms will be bounded and converges into industry growth average over time.
Innovation performance also exhibits decrease over phases, supporting hypothesis
4 and 7. As shown in table 3, in the origination phase the average count of patents is
significantly different between clustered and non-clustered firms with t-statistic of 10.37
passing the 99 percent critical t-value 2.75 with more than 30 degrees of freedom, while
the t-statistic of the mean difference reduces into 5.15 almost by a half given the same
critical value during the convergence phase. This significant reduction of p-values
between the origination and the convergence phase suggests that innovation performance
of clustered firms has decreased over time, implying the magnitude of agglomeration
economies dwindle over time.
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[Insert Table 3 about here]
Multivariate analysis. In most cases, our multivariate analysis also supports the
results from the univariate analysis, even after controlling for possible industry effects.
As exhibited in table 4, hazard rate analyses indicate that clustered firms’ activities
related to cost economies and legitimacy, and their innovation performance diminish over
time after controlling for industry variations (average growth of clustered and nonclustered firms are not included in multivariate analysis).
Models for public and private equity offerings suggest that clustered firms benefit
more in the origination phase, compared to themselves in the convergence phase and nonclustered firms over time. This confirms that the benefits of access to financial resources
within geographic clustering decrease over time. Innovation performance model also
exhibits consistent results with univariate analysis. The dominance of innovation
performance of clustered firms in the origination phase, compared to that of clustered
firms in the convergence phase or non-clustered firms in any phases, signifies that
outperforming innovation performance of clustered firms reduces over time. However,
models for research alliances and total amount of financing show increase in the relevant
activities of clustered firms over time, after controlling for industry effects. These results
are inconsistent with the results of univariate analysis. We may need to further elaborate
the models with respect to alliances and total financing amount.
Industry control variables shows positive signs, as we expected. That is, as
industry levels of all events (public and private equity offerings, research alliances, and
innovations) increase, an average biotechnology firm is more likely to experience the
events. The negative sign of bio-stock index in the model of private offerings shows the
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substitutable relation between public and private offerings. The negative sign of bio-stock
index in the innovation model may imply that there exist lags between financial funding
and innovation outcomes (patenting).
[Insert Table 4 about here]

Concluding remarks
We have empirically tested Pouder & St. John's propositions (1996) on the
evolutions of geographic clusters, in the context of the U.S. biotechnology industry. We
find that clustered biotech firms exhibit higher cost economies and legitimacy in
obtaining resources (e.g., financial funds by private and public equity offerings, and
strategic alliances) than non-clustered competitors during the origination period of cluster
development. While, after the early period, such clustered firms' advantages in resource
access are statistically significantly declining. Compared to that of non-clustered firms,
innovation performance of clustered firms shows similar declining over time. In addition,
the difference of growth in number of firms between geographically clustered and nonclustered regions decreases after the origination period. These findings suggest the
decline of positive net benefits from geographic clustering over time. In particular, the
evolutionary path of clustered firms in our sample appears to follow the third-order
polynomial function of time.
Given the inconsistent empirical results in the literature on whether there are
positive net benefits to geographically clustered firms, this study sheds light on the
importance of time dimension in geographic clustering to understand the net benefits of
geographic clustering. Since economies and diseconomies of agglomeration change over
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time, the net benefits of geographic clustering can be time-variant, possibly leading to
different empirical results if the evolution of geographic clustering is not appropriately
considered. Accordingly, this study answers a call to empirical studies on dynamics of
geographic clustering.
This study is not free from its limitations. Some concerns may be related to rightcensoring issues. As we see that the average length of the convergence phase in our
sample is three years while that of the origination phase is twenty-two years, there may
be concerns about small number of sample years of the convergence phase. More year
observations in updated data sets should be considered in the future study. For more
generality, we can also consider other industries in which cluster declines are already
observed (e.g., decline of Route 128 Boston areas in the minicomputer industry, as
suggested by Pouder & St. John (1996)).
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Figure 1
Evolutionary path of clustered and non-clustered firms*
Number of
firms (growth)

Origination
phase

Convergence
phase

Clustered firms

Non-clustered firms

Time

* This figure is modified from the one by Pouder & St. John (1996).

25

Decline
phase

Table 1
Features and evolution of geographic clusters in the biotechnology industry, 1973-1997*
Total
Entries

Total
Exits

Total
Density

Industry
cumulative
density (%)

Year of
the first
entry

Estimated
end of the
origination
phase**

Convergence
phase

Length of
origination
phase
(years)

Length of
convergence
phase in the
study period
(years)

San
97
Francisco
136
39
97
1973
1994
1994-1997
22
3
(15.7)
(Cluster 1)
Boston MA
171
100
26
74
1973
1994
1994-1997
22
3
(Cluster 2)
(27.7)
San Diego
231
74
14
60
1973
1995
1995-1997
23
2
(Cluster 3)
(37.4)
NY-Tristate
285
73
19
54
1974
1993
1993-1997
20
5
(Cluster 4)
(46.1)
D.C. area
329
54
10
44
1973
1994
1994-1997
22
3
(Cluster5)
(53.2)
Philadelphia
370
53
12
41
1975
1995
1995-1997
21
4
(Cluster 6)
(59.9)
L.A. area
391
37
16
21
1973
1993
1993-1997
21
4
(Cluster 7)
(63.3)
N. Carolina
422
37
6
31
1973
1995
1995-1997
23
2
(Cluster 8)
(68.3)
Texas
446
30
6
24
1976
1994
1994-1997
19
6
(Cluster 9)
(72.2)
Seattle
469
29
6
23
1978
1996
1996-1997
19
6
(Cluster 10)
(75.9)
Wisconsin
483
15
1
14
1977
(Cluster 11)
(78.2)
Colorado
491
14
6
8
1980
(Cluster 12)
(79.4)
Minnesota
500
14
5
9
1975
(Cluster 13)
(80.9)
Michigan
508
14
6
8
1978
(Cluster 14)
(82.2)
Florida
519
13
2
11
1979
(Cluster 15)
(84.0)
Oregon
529
11
1
10
1974
(Cluster 16)
(85.6)
Ohio
537
11
3
8
1973
(Cluster 17)
(86.9)
Georgia
546
10
1
9
1981
(Cluster 18)
(88.3)
Utah
554
10
2
8
1973
(Cluster 19)
(89.6)
Other non618
clustered
90
26
64
1973
(100)
regions
Industry
825
207
618
618
1973
1994
1994-1997
22
3
total/average
*Since we treat smaller clusters than cluster 10 in Seattle area as non-clusters, phases of clusters in non-cluster areas cannot be
considered by definition. By definition, the convergence period ends when the difference between the density of a cluster and the
average density of non-clusters becomes zero. During our study period, the industry exhibits no such points, leading to only
origination and convergence phases in the industry.
** We estimate the end of the origination phase of each cluster by the largest difference between density of a cluster and the average
density of non-cluster regions (i.e., cluster 11 to 19 and other non-clustered regions).
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Table 2
Polynomial regression models on the growth rates of clustered firms, 1973-1997
1st order polynomial
model

2nd order polynomial
model

3rd order polynomial
model

25.90
(1.38)

34.37
(5.74)
-0.36
(0.21)

-58.29
(16.87)
0.9495

-100.92
(34.91)
0.9579
F(1, 22)=2.96
25

-15.72
(4.25)
4.36
(0.42)
-0.12
(0.01)
18.11
(8.35)
0.9947
F(1, 21) = 125.06
25

Time
Time-square
Time-cube
Constant
R-square
F statistics
N
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Table 3
Univariate analysis: mean differences between clustered and non-clustered firms over
phases*
Origination

Cost economies
and legitimacy
Yearly firm avg. #
of public offerings
Yearly firm avg. #
of private offerings
Yearly firm avg.
amount of
financing
Yearly firm avg. #
of research
alliances
Innovations
Yearly firm avg. #
of patents
Total firm years
(N)
Average growth
rate
Estimated beta of a
regression on time
Total years (N)

Convergence

Clustered firms

Nonclustered
firms

1.03
(1.29)
2.13
(2.65)

0.61
(0.88)
0.97
(1.61)

48.66
(91.44)

10.99
(34.61)

5.17
(7.40)

t
statistic

Overall

NonClustered firms clustered
firms

t
statistic

Clustered
firms

Nonclustered
firms

1.11
(1.32)
2.46
(2.85)

0.67
(0.94)
1.22
(1.95)

t
statistic

1.30
(1.36)
3.20
(3.11)

0.84
(1.07)
1.94
(2.60)

15.76

61.60
(89.82)

24.94
(36.70)

9.09

52.70
(91.13)

14.51
(35.66)

18.55

2.37
(3.57)

14.34

6.36
(8.09)

2.88
(3.73)

9.53

5.54
(7.64)

2.50
(3.62)

17.50

6.03
(11.94)

2.75
(6.40)

10.37

6.17
(12.62)

3.21
(7.92)

5.15

6.08
(12.16)

2.86
(6.82)

11.52

6959

1510

3164

509

10123

2019

27.70
(1.05)
22

9.03
(0.48)
22

-9.00
(5.20)
3

-2.5
(1.44)
3

24.9
(1.20)
25

7.71
(0.55)
25

12.17
16.27

75.85

7.18
8.64

-2.09

* In the parentheses, standard deviations are provided. Critical values of t-statistics with +100, 40 and 4
degrees of freedom at 0.01 significance level are 2.58, 2.71 and 4.60, respectively.
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14.57
18.78

65.11

Table 4
Multivariate analysis: Results from hazard rate and OLS regression models

Clustered firms in the
origination phase (=1)
Clustered firms in the
convergence phase (=1)
Industry total in quarterly
public offerings
Industry total in quarterly
private offerings
Industry total in quarterly
research alliances
Industry total in quarterly
patents
Industry (Bio) stock index
Constant
Likelihood/R-square ^
N

Public
offerings

Private
offerings

Research
alliances

Innovations
(patents)

1.07***
(0.16)
0.23
(0.17)
0.02***
(0.007)

1.05***
(0.17)
0.69***
(0.16)

0.68***
(0.15)
0.80***
(0.15)

0.82***
(0.24)
-0.17
(0.26)

Amount of
financing
(OLS)
34.80***
(8.31)
44.42***
(7.47)

0.02***
(0.001)
-0.20***
(0.04)
-7.93***
(0.30)
743.85
11311

4.35
(2.42)
-0.22
(8.41)
0.0345
12160

0.02***
(0.003)
-0.01***
(0.001)

0.14*
(0.06)
-9.89***
(0.26)
-1172.87
11311

-0.3***
(0.93)
-8.04***
(0.22)
-1582.97
11311

-0.07
(0.04)
-6.88***
(0.18)
-969.67
11311

^ Since the model of amount of financing is estimated by ordinary least square estimation, R-square is
provide.
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